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President Trump’s Tariffs – Status Update

The purpose of this update is to provide the latest developments on the various tariffs being imposed on exports to the United States. The tariff situation is changing frequently, sometimes on a daily basis. We strive to obtain updated information and to post updated versions.

 

On July 31, 2025, President Trump signed an Executive Order modifying the reciprocal tariff rates on imports to the United States effective August 7, subsequent to his April 2 Executive Order to impose reciprocal tariffs on imports to rectify trade practices contributing to the United States’ trade deficits. Since then, most of the US’s major trading partners have negotiated the tariff rates to be imposed. The purpose of the July 31 Executive Order is to anchor the agreements the United States achieved and to “punish” countries that failed to reach an agreement with the US. Inter alia, a 15% tariff was imposed on Israel’s exports of goods to the United States.

Up until August 1, the United States reached special agreements on tariff rates with several countries. However, readers should be circumspect about the use of the term “agreement” within this context. With the exception of the agreement with Britain, these are oral agreements that lack proper detailed documentation and engage merely in principles. It appears it will take years to draft detailed trade agreements between the countries.

 

The table below presents the main agreements achieved, as published by the Trump Administration. Basically, the countries consented to the imposition of a particular tariff rate on products imported to the United States, while they refrain from imposing retaliatory tariffs. Some of the signatory countries also agreed to invest considerable sums of money in the United States and to open their markets to American imports.

 

With regard to countries that failed to reach agreements with the United States, President Trump’s Executive Order of April 2 imposed reciprocal tariffs of 10% on all goods imported into the United States and higher “special reciprocal tariffs” on imports from several countries with whom the United States has a large trade deficit. Particularly high tariffs have been imposed on imports from countries the US suspects will attempt to circumvent various trade restrictions. For example, the US imposed special 40% tariffs on imports from Laos, apparently due to the concern that Laos will attempt to ship its exports through China, and a special 35% tariff on imports from Iraq and Serbia, due to the concern that Iran and Russia will attempt to ship their exports through these countries. Other reasons for imposing particularly high tariffs relate to a country’s political disagreements with the United States. For example, President Trump imposed a 30% tariff on South Africa; an inclusive 50% tariff on Brazil, due to the trial underway against Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro; and a 35% tariff on Canada, alleging that Canada is not doing enough to prevent drugs from entering the United States. Trump also imposed high tariffs on countries with large trade deficits with the United States that have not yet reached trade agreements.

 

In addition, President Trump announced an increase of tariffs on steel and aluminum to 50%, regardless of the country of origin, and a 25% tariff on automobile imports into the United States. On July 30, President Trump announced the imposition of a 50% tariff on imports of copper pipes and wires. The president also announced the cancellation of all de minimis exemptions on product imports valued at less than USD 800, which will now be subject to the standard rules on imports to the United States.

 

Reports are that the US Department of Commerce is currently examining imports of pharmaceuticals,  computer chips, and semiconductors. It is likely these examinations will also result in the imposition of special tariffs on all or some of these products.

 

The United States’ largest trade deficit was and still is opposite China. President Trump already decided to impose substantial tariffs on China that, at one point, reached 145%. At the moment, intensive negotiations are underway between the two countries. In the meantime, the tariff on Chinese products has been lowered to about 30%.

 

Further negotiations are also underway with Mexico, which is a major trading partner of the United States.

Tariffs Imposed on Israeli Goods

As stated above, President Trump imposed a 15% tariff on goods imported from Israel. Many were surprised by the high tariff rate and criticized the Israeli government for failing to reach an agreement with the United States. In fact, an examination of all agreements the United States has reached so far shows that a 15% tariff rate is not high and apparently is not far from the tariff rate that would have been imposed on Israeli goods had the countries reached an agreement.

Like with other countries, the 15% tariff does not include imports of particular products to the United States (such as steel, automotive products, and copper), which are subject to special import tariffs.

 

It is important to note that if the US indeed imposes special tariffs on pharmaceuticals, computer chips, and semiconductors, this could significantly harm Israeli exports.

So far, the US has not imposed tariffs on imports of services into the United States. In the Israeli context, this is especially critical, since most of Israel’s exports to the United States are in the services sector, particularly computer services.

Legal Situation in the United States

According to the United States Constitution, the US Congress, and not the president, is vested the authority to impose tariffs. Congress granted the president limited powers to impose emergency tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). President Trump has announced several emergencies that justify his imposition of tariffs: illegal imports of fentanyl (a powerful painkiller used as a key ingredient of illegal drugs and medicines in the United States), the United States’ trade deficit, and particular issues surrounding products such as steel and automobiles. President Trump imposed tariffs by invoking his emergency powers pursuant to the IEEPA. Two federal courts have already ruled that Trump acted with ultra vires by exceeding the limits of  the IEEPA, since a trade deficit, for example, cannot be considered an emergency. These rulings are currently being appealed before the District of Columbia Federal Court of Appeals. During a recent hearing before an expanded panel of the court, a significant number of justices expressed doubt as to the legality of the executive orders.

 

Prima facie, the trade agreements Trump has already achieved will remain in effect regardless of the ultra vires claims against him. On the other hand, the trade agreements rely on the assumption the president has broad authorities to impose and cancel tariffs. In the absence of such authority, the trade agreements may need to be renegotiated.

 

Global Legal Situation

Since World War II and until recent years, there was a consensus among Western countries that low tariffs are harmful to economies and that discriminatory tariffs between countries are particularly deleterious. This consensus was anchored in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs of 1947 (GATT) and in the activities of the World Trade Organization established in 1995. Over the last decade, it became increasingly evident that the lowering of tariff rates had negative consequences, particularly the migration of industrial manufacturing from wealthy Western countries to Southeast Asia, China, and Africa. The migration of industrial manufacturing to these countries caused economic hardship in entire regions of the United States whose subsistence relies on industrial manufacturing. President Trump’s tariff policy is designed to specifically address this problem. According to his rationale, manufacturing plants will return to the United States to avoid paying the heavy tariffs.

 

President Trump’s tariff hike plan constitutes direct breaches of the United States’ covenants under the GATT, which prohibits discriminatory tariffs between countries and the raising of tariffs that have already been lowered. De facto, the cornerstone of President Trump’s policy is to impose discriminatory tariffs, since he believes they are strong bargaining chips during negotiations to get countries to increase their investments in the United States and open their markets to American imports. Either way, President Trump’s tactic appears to breach US covenants under the GATT.

 

President Trump is finding it relatively easy to employ his strategy due to the weakening of the World Trade Organization. For example, the United States has refrained from nominating candidates for membership in the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body for several years, a fact that effectively paralyzed this important institution, which serves as a quasi-judicial court tasked with resolving international trade disputes. The WTO’s Appellate Body has been unable to review appeals due to ongoing vacancies since 2020. Several countries have actually filed complaints against the United States with the WTO, but one can assume the WTO is incapable of wielding any substantial influence over US policy.

 

On the other hand, the United States’ chaotic trade policy could fundamentally redraw the map of world trade. If countries can no longer rely on low tariff rates in the United States, they will be compelled to develop new markets and reach agreements that exclude the United States.

 

The US tariff policy poses significant economic repercussions. Many economists believe President Trump’s plan is damaging. They contend that raising tariffs in order to cause manufacturing to return to the United States will trigger significant hikes in product prices and will not spur any significant diversion of manufacturing to the United States. Moreover, studies show that about half of the cost of the tariffs is being imposed on American consumers through price hikes.

 

The United States’ imposition of tariffs also poses considerable global economic repercussions. The United States is imposing tariffs on different countries at different rates, which could trigger shifts of massive volumes of manufacturing and trade between countries. Countries will relocate manufacturing plants to countries that have lower tariffs on exports to the United States, and we can expect to see wide-scale attempts to “cheat” with respect to various products’ country of manufacture.

 

These changes in trade agreements, tariff rates, and economic relations between major economies are creating considerable uncertainties. Companies seeking an accurate understanding of the implications on their operations should obtain expert legal counsel to provide ongoing updates on the latest legal developments.

 

Country and  agreement date in 2025

Tariff on goods imported into the US (US government’s estimated tariff volume)

Additional customs tariffs

Additional nonmonetary undertakings

UK

(May 8)

10%, plus tariffs in effect prior to February 2025

(USD 22 billion)

Steel: 25%.

Cars: 10% on up to the first 100,000 cars.

27.5% on every additional car.

Particular aviation industry products are tariff-free.

Reciprocal lowering of tariffs on meat.

(The agreement does not include pharmaceuticals, computer chips, or semiconductors, on which special tariffs might be imposed.)

To open the UK market to meat and ethanol imports from the United States.

Vietnam

(July 3)

20%

No tariff on product imports from the United States.

To remove non-tariff trade restrictions.

Indonesia

(July 22)

19%

No tariff on product imports from the United States.

To remove non-tariff trade restrictions.

To recognize US standards for cars, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics.

To issue licensing exemption for US agricultural and food products.

Japan

(July 23)

15%

(USD 24 billion)

15% on cars.

(The agreement does not include pharmaceuticals, computer chips, or semiconductors, on which special tariffs might be imposed.)

 

To increase rice imports and to further increase purchases of American products, e.g., purchasing one hundred aircrafts from Boeing.

To open the Japanese market to American car imports.

To invest USD 550 billion

in the United States.

EU

(July 27)

15%

15% on cars, pharmaceuticals, computer chips, and semiconductors, even if the decision is made to impose a higher tariff on them in other countries.

Return to January 2025 tariff rates for aviation, chemical, and other products.

No tariff on product imports from the United States.

To remove non-tariff trade restrictions on imports of particular agricultural and food products.

To buy energy (oil, gas, etc.) from the United States at the volume of USD 750 billion over the next three years.

European companies are to invest USD 600 billion in the United States by 2029.

South Korea

(July 30)

15%

15% on cars.

US undertaking not to impose higher tariffs on South Korean pharmaceuticals, computer chips, and semiconductors than those imposed on these products from other countries.

To invest USD 350 billion in the United States (USD 150 billion in a shipbuilding partnership).

To commit to purchase liquefied natural gas at the volume of USD 100 billion.

 

 

Tags: Tariffs